🇻🇪🇨🇳 Venezuela-China relations 2025 – full mega-what-to-know guide

1/ Relationship level: “All-weather strategic partnership” (最高级别) since 2023 – China’s only one in South America.

2/ Key 2025 high-level contacts

• May 9 – Xi Jinping meets Maduro in Moscow (VE Day 80th). Xi: “firmly support VEN sovereignty & social stability”, pledges deeper energy/agri/tech/education coop

• Nov 22 – Xi sends Maduro birthday letter: categorically rejects “external interference”

• May – Delcy Rodríguez 17 meetings in Beijing incl. VP Han Zheng & CNPC execs → AI in oil + social programs

• June 8 – CCP Intl Dept Wu Hansheng in Caracas meets Diosdado Cabello → new party-to-party cadre training pact

• Aug – DefMin Padrino López + Chinese Amb Lan Hu → “strengthen military coop” amid US Navy deployments

3/ New policies & money

• Nov 2025 – Zero-tariff agreement on ~400 tariff lines (announced Shanghai Expo by Dep FM Coromoto Godoy)

• July 2025 China-CELAC Forum – .2B regional credit line + specific VEN power-grid modernization package (heavy equipment already arriving)

• Revival of Special Economic Zones under 2015-2025 Joint Plan

• Non-oil exports to China +120% H1 2025 (shrimp, cocoa, coffee)

4/ Foreign-ministry statements (2025)

• Yván Gil (Nov): “eternal gratitude to China for rejecting US hostilities in the Caribbean”

• Mao Ning (Aug 20): “China firmly opposes any country threatening use of force against VEN… rejects interference under any pretext”

• Lin Jian (Jul 2024, still quoted): congratulated Maduro re-election & 50th anniv of ties

5/ Military dimension (low-profile but growing)

• Aug-Sep: intensified contacts after US SOUTHCOM ops

• Chinese military analysts openly say VEN is key node for BRI maritime routes; any US action would “trigger Beijing response”

• No big arms deals 2024-25, but training, tech transfer, dual-use logistics increasing

6/ Recent scholarly takes (2024-2025)

• Victor Mijares et al. (New Political Economy 2025): 2001-2023 Chinese engagement → reinforced rentierism, blocked industrialization, fueled corruption

• Kaplan/Penfold (Wilson Center): China now “defensive lender”, protects B exposure, quietly hedges with opposition contacts

• CFR 2025 report: lifeline for Maduro regime but diminishing economic returns for Beijing

• USIP perceptions survey: Venezuelans view China favorably (scholarships, direct engagement) but blame US sanctions for lack of alternatives

• Pepperdine Policy Review (Noah Jackson): recommends partial sanctions reimposition to peel Caracas away from Beijing

7/ Bottom line
China keeps Maduro afloat with oil purchases, selective credits, and diplomatic cover.
Venezuela gives China cheap heavy crude + geopolitical beachhead 90 miles from US allies.

No return to 2007-2014 mega-loan era; relationship shifted from “development partner” to “survival pact”.

Still strategic, still deepening, but far more cautious on the Chinese side.
🇻🇪🇨🇳 November 11, 2025

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